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“Fear alerts us to dangers, surprise registers novelty, and disgust helps us avoid 
potential sources of contamination. Many of these functions unite us with simpler 
creatures, and are, in that sense, among our more primitive or ancient psychological 
capacities. But emotions also play a role in the most sophisticated aspects of human 
mental life: they play a role in forming enduring social bonds to individuals and 
large groups, they give us pleasure in the arts, and they make fundamental 
contributions to human morality.”  
Jesse Prinz (2009, p. 519) 
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Abstract 
Moral and immoral behavior can elicit strong emotions. For instance, people 
can get outraged when they witness unfair behavior (i.e., they experience third-
party anger) and they can be intensely moved and overwhelmed by exceptional 
helpfulness (i.e., they experience feelings of being moved). Using these feelings of 
third-party anger and being moved as examples, this dissertation set out to clarify 
how morality and emotions are related. Specifically, the role of outcomes and norms 
for emotional reactions and behavioral consequences were investigated within six 
empirical studies. Results indicate that third-party anger and feelings of being 
moved are counterparts: whereas witnessing behavior that violates norms (e.g., 
unfairness or disrespect) elicits anger, witnessing behavior that surpasses norms 
(e.g., exceptional helpfulness or outstanding achievement) elicits feelings of being 
moved. These emotional episodes seem to be highly relevant for social life as they 
were associated with punishment decisions, voting intentions and voluntary work. 
Explaining the elicitation of these emotions was improved when expanding 
established appraisal assessment methods. Taken together, these findings provide a 
framework for applying appraisal research to moral emotions and contribute to 
identifying links between moral principles and emotions. In addition, they point to 
practical implications concerning anger-induction through the media and the role 
of being moved in persuasion processes.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Moralisches und unmoralisches Verhalten kann mit starken Emotionen 
verbunden sein. Beispielsweise kann das Beobachten einer Ungerechtigkeit echte 
Empörung auslösen (d. h. third-party anger). Außergewöhnliche Hilfsbereitschaft 
dagegen kann zu Gefühlen des Bewegtseins und der Überwältigung führen (d. h. 
being moved). Am Beispiel dieser Emotionen beleuchtet die vorliegende 
Dissertation wie Moral und Emotionen zusammenhängen. Dafür wurde die Rolle 
von Konsequenzen und Normen für emotionale Reaktionen und damit verbundene 
Verhaltensweisen anhand von sechs empirischen Studien untersucht. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Gefühle des Bewegtseins das positive Pendent zu Ärger 
darstellen. Während Ärger durch Normverletzungen ausgelöst wird (z. B. 
Ungerechtigkeit oder Respektlosigkeit), werden Gefühle des Bewegtseins durch 
das Beobachten positiver Normabweichungen ausgelöst (z. B. ungewöhnliche 
Hilfsbereitschaft oder außergewöhnliche Leistung). Diese emotionalen Episoden 
scheinen wesentlich für ein soziales Zusammenleben zu sein, da sie mit 
Bestrafungsentscheidungen, politischen Wahlentscheidungen und ehrenamtlicher 
Arbeit verbunden waren. Wie diese Emotionen ausgelöst werden konnte wesentlich 
besser erklärt werden, wenn bestehende Methoden zur Erfassung von Appraisals 
(d. h. subjektiven Bewertungen) erweitert wurden. Zusammengenommen zeigen 
diese Befunde auf, wie Appraisaltheorien auf moralische Emotionen angewendet 
werden können und tragen dazu bei, Verbindungen zwischen moralischen 
Grundsätzen und Emotionen zu identifizieren. Sie weisen außerdem auf praktische 
Implikationen hin, wie der Auslösung von Ärger durch Medien und der Rolle von 
Gefühlen des Bewegtseins in Überzeugungsprozessen. 
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Preface 
Although people can be selfish, pure self-interest cannot explain human 
behavior well. For instance, 6.73 billion Euro were donated for charity in Germany 
in 2015 (DZI, 2016) and every 10th person volunteered to help refugees (Ahrens, 
2016). Although these pro-social behaviors can satisfy egoistic motives like social 
reputation, the concept of moral concerns helps to explain such pro-social acts (e.g., 
Batson & Shaw, 1991; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Haidt, 2007; Singer & Steinbeis, 
2009). Thus, in addition to self-interest, moral concerns seem to guide our judgment 
and behavior. 
How people derive their moral judgments and what motivates them to act 
accordingly has been the target of philosophical disputes and psychological 
research for decades. The role of emotions is one controversy within that debate 
(e.g., Greene et al., 2008; Haidt, 2001; Huebner, Dwyer & Hauser, 2009; Prinz, 
2006). This dispute has often been led back to the moral philosophy of Kant and 
Hume. In his theory on pure reason, Immanuel Kant describes emotions as 
disruptive factor for moral reasoning whereas David Hume claims that moral 
sentiments (or emotions) are necessary for morally proper behavior (for a 
comparison of the two approaches see Denis, 2008). Current research widely 
acknowledges that both – moral reasoning and moral emotions – influence moral 
judgement and behavior (e.g., Greene et al., 2008; Haidt, 2001; Huebner, Dwyer & 
Hauser, 2009; Prinz, 2006). However, scholars disagree about the elicitors and 
behavioral consequences of these emotions. For instance, some argue that norm 
violations are more closely associated with emotions than the situation’s 
consequences (e.g. Greene et al., 2008), whereas others empathize the importance 
of consequences that involve others’ suffering for emotions like compassion (e.g., 
Nussbaum, 2001). In addition, researchers disagree about whether specific moral 
principles are rooted in specific emotional systems (e.g., Haidt & Joseph, 2004) or 
not (e.g., Cameron, Lindquist & Gray, 2015). To identify these links between 
emotion and morality is crucial to understand why people sometimes restrain their 
self-interest, which makes social life possible. 
This dissertation set out to clarify how emotion and morality are related 
using two emotions as examples: third-party anger and being moved. People can 
get outraged when they witness unfair behavior that affects others, i.e. they 
experience third-party anger, (e.g., Batson et al., 2007; Montada & Schneider, 
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1989) and people can be overwhelmed when they witness exceptional helpfulness, 
i.e. they experience feelings of being moved (e.g., Cova & Deonna, 2014; 
Menninghaus, 2015). These emotions are experienced by third-parties who witness 
an interaction between others without being directly affected by the situation 
themselves. That is, they are not harmed by the unfairness and they do not profit 
from the help. Yet, they experience strong emotions. As for moral emotions in 
general, scholars disagree about elicitors and consequences of these emotions (e.g., 
Batson et al., 2007; Cova & Deonna, 2014; Menninghaus, 2015; Montada & 
Schneider, 1989). This dissertation investigates third-party anger and being moved 
and thereby contributes to the question how morality and emotions are related.  
In the following sections, I therefore provide an overview of research on 
third-party anger and feelings of being moved. I use an appraisal approach to 
explain how these emotions are elicited and thereby provide a framework for 
applying appraisal theories to so-called moral emotions. Deducted from this 
framework, I present my research questions about the elicitation and consequences 
of third-party anger and being moved. The empirical part of this dissertation 
summarizes six studies reported in three manuscripts, which investigated these 
questions. Based on an integration of results, I discuss theoretical, methodological 
and practical implications.  
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Moral Emotions 
Moral judgement and morally relevant behavior sometimes involve strong 
emotions such as compassion or guilt. These emotional reactions can be considered 
moral emotions. According to Haidt (2008), “moral systems are interlocking sets 
of […] mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make 
social life possible” (p. 70). In line with this definition of morality, moral emotions 
can be defined by their elicitors: An emotion can be considered as moral, when it is 
elicited by events that affect others’ well-being or moral norms but not by pure self-
interest (Haidt, 2003). According to this definition, compassion and guilt are 
prototypical examples for moral emotions as these emotions are elicited when 
someone else suffers – but not the emoter him- or herself. However, other emotions 
can also be moral to the extent they are elicited by events that affect others’ well-
being or moral norms (Haidt, 2003). From this view, third-party anger and feelings 
of being moved can be seen as moral emotions as well. 
 
Third-party Anger 
People can get angry when they witness bullying (Gross & Levenson, 1995) 
or when they learn about child labor (Cronin, Reysen, & Branscombe, 2012). In 
these situations, the person who experiences anger (i.e., the emoter) is not directly 
involved in the situation but witnesses an interaction between at least two other 
parties (i.e., the perpetrator and the victim). Therefore, these emotional episodes 
can be referred to as third-party anger, i.e. anger that third-parties experience, when 
they witness an injustice that affects others (Landmann & Hess, 2016a). In these 
situations, negative consequences for the self play only a minor role. Others’ well-
being and/or moral norms seem to be more important. Therefore, third-party anger 
can be seen as a moral emotion. 
Third-party anger, although differently labelled,1 has been intensely studied 
because of the huge impact this emotion has on behavior. For instance, third-party 
anger is associated with collective action (e.g., Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer & 
Leach, 2004), with punishment in economic games (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002) 
and with supporting violent actions in social conflict (e.g., Halperin, 2013). Thus, 
third-party anger is highly relevant for social life. What exactly elicits this form of 
anger, however, is not clear.  
4 
 
Being Moved 
A similar argument can be made for feelings of being moved. Being moved 
is considered a specific emotion that is associated with chills (i.e., shivers and goose 
bumps) and tears in the eyes (Cova & Deonna, 2014; Menninghaus et al., 2015). 
People can be moved by social situations such as weddings, friendship or 
exceptional helpfulness (Menninghaus et al., 2015). For being moved by 
exceptional helpfulness, others’ outcome and moral norms seem to be much more 
relevant than self-interest. Thus, being moved can be seen as a moral emotion as 
well.  
Although being moved is a relatively new concept within psychological 
research, the societal influence of this emotion might be strong. That is, being 
moved by a situation that positively portrays a personal value2 should reinforce 
attachment to the respective value and therefore facilitate actions, which are in 
accordance with this value (Cova & Deonna, 2014). In line with this, being moved 
by exceptional helpfulness facilitates helping behavior (Schnall, Roper & Fessler, 
2010) and charitable donations (Freeman, Aquino & McFarran, 2009; Thomson & 
Siegel, 2013) and it reduces prejudice (Lai, Haidt & Nosek, 2014). Thus, feelings 
of being moved can have a huge impact on social life. How these feelings are 
elicited, however, is not clear.  
In sum, third-party anger and being moved are moral emotions, which are 
highly relevant for social life. This dissertation investigates how these emotions are 
elicited using an appraisal approach to moral emotions.  
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Appraisals of Moral Emotions 
According to appraisal theories, emotions are grounded in appraisals 
(Scherer, 1999). These appraisals are “a person’s subjective evaluation […] of the 
personal significance of a situation, object or event on a number of dimensions or 
criteria” (Scherer, 1999, p. 637). Emotions are “elicited and differentiated” on the 
basis of these appraisals (Scherer, 1999, p. 637). In other words, appraisals relate 
situational features to personal concerns and thus determine the emotion felt. For 
instance, fear is elicited when a situation is appraised as potentially harmful for 
oneself and joy is elicited when a situation is appraised as beneficial for own 
interests (Scherer, 1999). These appraisals map on five dimensions – novelty, 
intrinsic pleasantness, goal-conduciveness, coping-potential and compatibility with 
standards – which are acknowledged by most appraisal theorists though differently 
labelled (see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003).  
Scholars have made several attempts to link appraisal theories to moral 
emotions (e.g., Hareli & Parkinson, 2008; Nussbaum, 2001; Omdahl, 1995; Smith, 
1993).3 These links are outlined in the following section and schematically depicted 
in Figure 1. Specifically, two appraisal dimensions might be particularly relevant 
for moral emotions – goal-conduciveness and compatibility with internal standards.  
 
Internal Standard Appraisals 
Appraisals of compatibility with internal standards address whether a 
behavior is compatible with own values (Scherer, 2001). For instance, when 
someone does not follow a fair procedure or when someone’s intentions are 
incompatible with own values, people typically appraise this incompatible with 
their internal standards. The relevance of these appraisals for moral emotions is 
widely acknowledged (see Hareli & Parkinson, 2008). They have been linked to 
anger (Montada & Schneider, 1989) and to feelings of being moved (Menninghaus, 
2015). In the following, these appraisals of compatibility with internal standards are 
referred to by the term internal standard appraisals. These internal standard 
appraisals explain why people respond emotionally to norm violations. 
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Outcome Appraisals 
Appraisals of goal-conduciveness address the evaluation of negative 
outcomes or goal blockage (Scherer, 2001). These appraisals typically address the 
emoter’s goals or well-being (Scherer, 2001). However, scholars have introduced 
additional processes that might account for the evaluation of others’ outcomes. 
Specifically, the emoter might take the perspective of another person and appraise 
the situation as if they were in their place (i.e., perspective-taking,4 Omdahl, 1995). 
Alternatively, the emoter might treat others’ well-being as a personal goal (i.e., 
eudaimonistic judgment,5 Nussbaum, 2001). Lastly, the emoter might identify with 
a group and appraise the situation on the group’s behalf (i.e., group-based 
appraisals,6 Smith, 1993). These appraisals of others’ outcome have been linked to 
several moral emotions including compassion (Nussbaum, 2001) and anger (Batson 
et al., 2007). In the following, these appraisals of goal-conduciveness are referred 
to by the term outcome appraisals. These outcome appraisals explain why people 
respond emotionally to situations that affect others’ well-being.  
 
Figure 1. Appraisals of Moral Emotions 
 
Note. The Figure shows how moral emotions and appraisal theories might be related. Appraisal 
dimensions based on Scherer’s appraisal theory of emotions (box in the middle), additional 
appraisal processes (left side) and exemplified moral emotions (right side) are depicted.  
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In sum, two appraisal dimensions can be identified, which are particularly 
relevant for moral emotions: Moral emotions can be elicited by internal standard 
appraisals (e.g., unfairness) or by outcome appraisals (e.g., others’ suffering). 
However, when considering third-party anger and being moved it appears that this 
appraisal approach to moral emotions is not specific enough. 
For instance, scholars disagree about the elicitation of third-party anger. 
Some argue that third-party anger is elicited by norm violations (i.e., moral outrage, 
Montada & Scheider, 1989) whereas others claim that we empathize with others 
and feel their frustration (i.e., empathic anger, Batson et al., 2007). As shown in 
Figure 1, the model of moral outrage implies that appraisals of compatibility with 
internal standards (internal standard appraisals) elicit third-party anger, whereas the 
model of empathic anger implies that appraisals of goal-conduciveness (outcome 
appraisals) explain the elicitation of third-party anger (Landmann & Hess, 2016a). 
The question of whether third-party anger is better understood as moral outrage or 
empathic anger was addressed in Manuscript 1.  
Other approaches to third-party anger are even more specific. According to 
moral foundation theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Graham, 2007), distinct 
types of moral standards exist. For instance, norm violations could address 
violations of fairness standards (e.g., cheating) or violations of purity standards 
(e.g., promiscuity). Each norm violation might elicit a specific emotion (Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004; 2008). For instance, fairness violations might elicit anger whereas 
purity violations elicit disgust. Thus, for third-party anger it might not only matter 
whether a norm is violated but also which norm this is. This question was addressed 
in Manuscript 2.  
Approaches to feelings of being moved challenge appraisal theories of 
emotion as well. Scholars agree that being moved is highly contingent on values 
(Cova & Deonna, 2014; Menninghaus et al., 2015). That is, a situation can only be 
moving if it is particularly relevant to the person’s values such as weddings or the 
birth of a child (Cova & Deonna, 2014; Menninghaus et al., 2015). As internal 
standard appraisals address the situation’s relevance for personal values, these 
appraisals might elicit feelings of being moved (Menninghaus et al., 2015). 
Appraisal research focuses on negative deviations from such internal standards 
(Scherer, 2001). However, feelings of being moved might be associated with 
positive deviations from standards (Landmann, Cova & Hess, 2016). Thus, 
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appraisals of surpassing standards might elicit feelings of being moved. The content 
of these appraisals of surpassing standards, however, is not clear. Being moved 
might be elicited by pro-social standards only (Menninghaus et al., 2015) or by any 
standard that is particularly relevant for the emoter (Cova & Deonna, 2014). These 
questions about the elicitation of being moved were addressed in Manuscript 3. 
In sum, appraisal theories provide a framework for investigating how third-
party anger and being moved are elicited. On this basis, research questions about 
the content of outcome and internal standard appraisals and their relevance for 
specific emotions can be identified. 
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Research Questions 
The objective of this dissertation was to clarify how morality and emotions 
are related using third-party anger and feelings of being moved as examples. As 
outlined above, specific research questions about the elicitation of these emotions 
can be derived from appraisal theories of emotion. Whether these processes are 
behaviorally relevant was investigated in addition. Particularly, research questions 
about cooperation and punishment (Manuscript 1), voting intentions (Manuscript 
2) and voluntary work (Manuscript 3) were specified.    
 
1) Is third-party anger explained by moral outrage or by empathic anger? (Manuscript 1) 
a. Is third-party anger elicited by norm violations, others’ negative 
outcomes or a combination of both? 
b. Which appraisals explain the elicitation of third-party anger? 
c. Does third-party anger lead to cooperation and/or punishment? 
 
2) Are specific moral principles associated with specific emotions? (Manuscript 2) 
a. Do emotional reactions depend on the type of moral transgression? 
b. Are links between moral transgressions and specific moral emotions in 
line with moral foundation theory? 
c. Are moral foundations associated with voting intentions? 
 
3) Are feelings of being moved elicited by surpassing internal standards? (Manuscript 3) 
a. Are feelings of being moved limited to pro-social situations?  
b. Are feelings of being moved elicited by appraisals about surpassing 
internal standards?  
c. Are feelings of being moved predicted by a match between individual 
and situational values? 
d. Are feelings of being moved related to voluntary work?  
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Summary of Empirical Studies 
These research questions were addressed in six studies presented in three 
manuscripts. All studies investigated self-reported emotional reactions to specific 
stimuli. As shown in Table 1, these stimuli varied in terms of compatibility with 
norms, others’ outcomes and/or the eliciting context. Specifically, independent 
influences of norm violations and others’ outcome on third-party anger and 
compassion (Manuscript 1), specific associations between different types of norm 
violations and moral emotions (Manuscript 2) and effects of positive norm 
deviations on feelings of being moved (Manuscript 3) were investigated. 
 
 
Table 1. Overview of empirical studies 
 Design Emotions 
Manuscript 1   
Study 1 Norm violation (mild vs. severe) x  
Others’ outcome (mild vs. severe) 
Anger 
Compassion 
Study 2 Norm violation (mild vs. severe) x  
Others’ outcome (mild vs. severe) x  
Context (investment vs. pharmaceutical) 
Anger 
Compassion 
Manuscript 2   
Study 1 Norm violation  
(care vs. fairness vs. authority vs. loyalty vs. purity) 
Anger 
Rage 
Compassion 
Disgust 
Resentment 
Contempt 
Manuscript 3   
Study 1 Stories (pro-social vs. neutral) 
Music (sublime vs. repetitive) 
Being Moved 
Elevation 
Joy 
Study 2 Context  
(relationships vs. success vs. humor) 
Being Moved 
Elevation 
Mirth 
Study 3 Deviation from Norms (positive vs. negative) x  
Context (pro-social vs. pro-environmental vs. sports) x 
Volunteer Group (pro-environmental vs. sports) 
Being Moved 
Joy 
Anger 
Sadness 
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Manuscript 1 
What elicits third-party anger? The effects of norm violations and others’ 
outcome on anger and compassion 
 
The first manuscript investigates how third-party anger is elicited. 
Specifically, we tested (a) whether anger is elicited by norm violations, others’ 
negative outcome or a combination of both, (b) whether the elicitation of anger is 
mediated by appraisals and (c) whether third-party anger leads to cooperation 
and/or punishment.  
For this, participants (N = 138) indicated their feelings and appraisals in 
response to a newspaper article. The article described a couple, who was advised 
by a banking assistant and invested money. Others’ outcome and moral violation 
were varied between subjects. The couple either lost money (severe negative 
outcome) or they did not lose any money in the end (mild negative outcome). The 
banking assistant was either honest (mild moral violation) or concealed the risk of 
the investment (severe moral violation). Third-party anger was affected by the 
moral violation only. Others’ outcome, although relevant for compassion, did not 
affect anger. These effects were mediated by internal standard appraisals and by 
outcome appraisals, respectively.  
In the second study (N = 89), we aimed to replicate these findings for the 
described investment context as well as for a different context - pharmaceutical 
research. As in the first study, anger was strongly affected by the moral violation 
but not (or less so) by others’ outcome. In addition, third-party anger was associated 
with altruistic punishment. That is, anger predicted the extent to which participants 
were willing to sacrifice own resources in order to reduce the perpetrator’s 
resources.  
In sum, third-party anger depended primarily on norm violations whereas 
compassion was highly contingent on others’ outcomes. This form of anger was 
predicted by internal standard appraisals and associated with punishment decisions. 
Thus, anger and punishment resulted from norm violations alone, independent of 
the harm done.  
  
12 
 
Manuscript 2 
Testing moral foundation theory: Are specific moral emotions elicited by 
specific moral transgressions? 
 
In the second manuscript, we addressed the question whether (a) emotional 
reactions depend on the type of moral transgression, (b) whether links between 
moral transgressions and specific moral emotions are in line with moral foundation 
theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2007) and (c) whether moral foundations are 
associated with voting intention.  
Specifically, we investigated emotional reactions to violations of care, 
fairness, authority, loyalty or purity. Therefore, participants (N = 195) indicated 
their emotional reactions in response to short vignettes. Emotional reactions 
differed according to the type of moral violation. However, the morality-emotion 
links supported moral foundation theory only partly. For instance, moral foundation 
theory predicts care-compassion, fairness-anger and purity-disgust links (Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004; 2007). In line with the theory, disgust was particularly strong for 
purity violations and compassion was particularly strong for violations of care. 
However, anger was strongly elicited by all moral violations except for purity 
violations. 
How much participants valued these moral foundations was associated with 
their voting intention. Specifically, participants who preferred Christian Democrats 
(“CDU”) or Social Democrats (“SPD”) valued the moral foundations authority, 
loyalty and purity more than those participants who preferred the Green Party 
(“Bündnis 90/Die Grünen”) or the Left Party (“Die Linke”) whereas no differences 
emerged for the moral foundations care and fairness. This replicates previous 
studies, which show that US-Americans’ political orientation and moral concerns 
are related (Graham et al., 2009, 2011), it demonstrates how these findings might 
be applied for the German political system and it strengthens the claim that moral 
foundations are behaviorally relevant.   
In sum, the type of norm violation differentiated between emotional 
reactions. However, the links between moral violations and moral emotions were 
only partially in line with moral foundation theory. 
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Manuscript 3 
Being moved by virtue, success and music. The role of surpassing internal 
standards 
 
In the third manuscript, we addressed the question how feelings of being 
moved are elicited. Specifically, we investigated (a) whether feelings of being 
moved are limited to pro-social situations, (b) whether appraisals of exceeding 
internal standards mediate the elicitation of being moved, (c) whether a match 
between individual and situational values predicts feelings of being moved and (d) 
whether feelings of being moved are associated with voluntary work.  
The first study was designed to test whether feelings of being moved are 
limited to pro-social situations. Therefore, participants (N = 58) responded to pro-
social texts and music. Participants were similarly moved by pro-social texts and 
by specific music but less so in respective control conditions. These feelings of 
being moved (i.e., moved, overwhelmed, and stirred) were associated with goose 
bumps, tears in the eyes and a warm feeling in the chest. This shows that feelings 
of being moved are not limited to pro-social situations but can be strongly elicited 
by music as well.  
The second study was designed to identify appraisals that explain how 
feelings of being moved are elicited. For this, participants (N = 109) responded to 
videos that portray relationships (e.g. family, friends), to videos that portray success 
(e.g. in sports or career) or to humoristic videos. Participants were moved by 
relationships and success but not by humor. The elicitation of being moved was 
mediated by appraisals of surpassing pro-social or achievement standards. In 
addition, an interaction between eliciting context and values was found. People who 
strongly identified with moral values were particularly moved by relationships but 
these moral values did not affect how intensely people were moved by success. This 
again shows that being moved is not limited to pro-social situations or to pro-social 
values. The common feature of moving situations was behavior that surpassed 
internal standards. 
The third study was designed to investigate how feelings of being moved 
are related to volunteering. Therefore, participants (N = 190) who worked 
voluntarily in a pro-environmental organization or in sports clubs indicated their 
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feelings and appraisals in response to newspaper articles. The articles described 
situations, which varied in norm deviation (positive vs. negative) and context 
(social vs. environment vs. sports). Positive norm deviations elicited feelings of 
being moved and as in Study 2, this elicitation was mediated by appraisals of 
exceeding internal standards. In addition, eliciting context and volunteer context 
interacted. That is, pro-environmental volunteers were more moved than sports 
volunteers in the environmental context, although both groups were similarly 
moved in the other contexts. In other words, a match between individual values 
(manifested in voluntary work) and the value portrayed in the situation predicted 
feelings of being moved. 
In sum, participants were moved by behavior that surpassed internal 
standards such as pro-social acts or outstanding success but not by situations 
without that constraint such as humor or norm violations. Thus, feelings of being 
moved were not limited to pro-social situations. However, they were elicited by 
appraisals about surpassing internal standards and they were particularly strong 
when individual and situational values matched.  
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Discussion 
This dissertation set out to clarify how morality and emotions are related. 
Specifically, we investigated consequences for others and deviations from norms 
as factors related to morality and third-party anger and feelings of being moved as 
moral emotions. In what follows, I will integrate the results of these investigations 
and discuss their implications in regard to third-party anger and being moved but 
also concerning different theoretical approaches that link morality and emotion. 
 
Third-party Anger 
The present research sheds light on the question why people respond with 
anger when they witness norm violations that affect others. Previous research had 
already shown that this type of anger, which we label third-party anger, is closely 
related to norm violations (e.g., Kals & Russell, 2001; Cronin et al., 2012; Nelissen 
& Zeelenberg, 2009). It was, however, not clear, whether these norm violations 
alone can elicit anger and whether anger depends on the type of norm violation.  
The first part of this question was addressed in Manuscript 1. Situations of 
third-party anger normally contain a norm violation (e.g., cheating) and a negative 
outcome for others (e.g., losing money). Hence, norm violations and others’ 
negative outcomes are normally confounded – in real world as well as in research 
(e.g., Cronin et al., 2012; Gross & Levenson, 1995; Kals & Russell, 2001). This 
opened the door for speculations about whether moral outrage (i.e., anger elicited 
by pure norm violations) even exists (e.g., O’Mara et al., 2011). The present 
research demonstrates that third-party anger can be elicited by pure norm violations 
independent of others’ outcome. This indicates that moral outrage exists: People 
can get angry by witnessing a moral violation independent of the harm done.  
The model of empathic anger (i.e., anger elicited by others’ negative 
outcomes, Batson et al., 2007), by contrast, was not supported. People did not get 
angry by a cared for other’s suffering alone. Feeling compassion for the victim, 
although considered as precondition for empathic anger by Batson et al. (2007), was 
not sufficient to elicit empathic anger. This indicates that the preconditions for 
empathic anger need to be reconsidered. Other factors like a particularly close 
relation to or identification with the victim are needed in addition. 
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This divergence of anger and compassion was replicated in Manuscript 2. 
In this study, anger emerged with compassion (e.g., in response to care violations) 
but also without compassion (e.g., in response to fairness violations). In addition, 
this study showed that anger is not limited to the moral principle of fairness – a link 
that has been variously affirmed (e.g. Cronin et al., 2012; Kals & Russell, 2001; 
Montada & Schneider, 1989). Rather, anger was strongly elicited by violations of 
care, fairness, authority and loyalty. Only violations of purity elicited little anger. 
Thus, anger can be elicited by several norm violations.  
Concerning action-tendencies of third-party anger, the present research 
shows that even anger elicited by pure norm violations can be associated with 
altruistic punishment (see Manuscript 1). This replicates previous research that 
links anger with punishment (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 
2009) but expands these findings by showing that anger elicited by pure norm 
violations can be related to punishment as well. Thus, third-party anger can 
motivate people to act selflessly. This selflessness, however, might be used to 
punish those who are responsible for the norm violation. This contradicts the 
assumption that pure norm violations elicit noble feelings, which do not lead to 
aggression (Batson et al., 2007). Instead, the present results suggest that even if the 
anger is completely justified it can lead to destructive actions. 
Taken together, third-party anger can be elicited by pure norm violations, 
independent of the harm done. These norm violations are not limited to unfairness. 
Rather, they include authority and loyalty violations as well. Violation of such 
norms can result in anger and punishment.  
 
Being Moved 
The present research also sheds light on the question what moves and 
overwhelms people. Previous research has shown that people are moved by 
exceptional helpfulness or critical life events like weddings (e.g. Menninghaus et 
al., 2015). However, it was not clear what exactly elicits this emotion. 
The present research identifies one common feature of moving situations: 
behavior that surpass internal standards. That is, people were moved by behavior 
that exceeds an internal standard such as exceptional helpfulness, outstanding 
success and achievement in different contexts but not by behavior without that 
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constraint such as humor or norm violations (Manuscript 3). In addition, people 
were moved to the extent they appraised these behaviors as exceeding an internal 
standard (Manuscript 3, Study 2 & 3). Further, a match between individual and 
situational values predicted feelings of being moved. Specifically, people who 
strongly identified with moral values were particularly moved by relationships 
(Manuscript 3, Study 2) and people with strong pro-environmental values were 
particularly moved by pro-environmental action (Manuscript 3, Study 3). Thus, 
being moved is not an automatic reaction to specific stimuli but can be explained 
by appraisals. The common feature of moving situations seems to be an exceptional 
positive behavior that touches personal values.  
The present research also indicates that feelings of being moved are not 
limited to pro-social situations. That is, feelings of being moved can be elicited by 
pro-social actions but also by non-prosocial stimuli such as music or outstanding 
achievement. These findings contradict the claim that feelings of being moved are 
limited to pro-social situations (Menninghaus et al., 2015). Their association with 
internal standard appraisals and their association with different values, however, is 
compatible with the claim that being moved is elicited by a personally relevant 
value that is perceived as standing out (Cova & Deonna, 2014). Thus, the present 
research contributes to understand how diverse the eliciting contexts for feelings of 
being moved can be.  
In particular, the present findings indicate that being moved sometimes 
functions as a moral emotion (i.e., when elicited by exceptional helpfulness or 
relationships) but it can also be a non-moral emotion (i.e., when elicited by success 
or music). Interestingly, this holds for most moral emotions. For instance, anger can 
be a moral emotion when elicited by injustices that affect others but also a non-
moral emotion when elicited by personal frustration (Haidt, 2003). Thus, an 
emotion is not in general moral or non-moral. The extent to which an emotion can 
be considered as moral strongly depends on the eliciting context. 
In addition, the findings concerning feelings of being moved suggest to 
combine different lines of research. That is, although the stimuli in Manuscript 3 
were previously used to elicit moral elevation (e.g., Haidt, 2000), admiration (e.g., 
Algoe & Haidt, 2009) or musical chills (e.g., Goldstein, 1980), they elicited strong 
feelings of being moved. This indicates that moral elevation, admiration and 
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musical chills are experienced similarly. Thus, these emotions might describe 
different facets of the same emotion – being moved.  
Taken together, the concept of being moved might be highly present in 
everyday life. People are moved by music, exceptional helpfulness and by 
outstanding success. The elicitation of these feelings can be explained by appraisals 
that relate situational features to own values. Thus, being moved might be the 
counterpart of third-party anger. Whereas one is elicited by standard violations the 
other is elicited by surpassing standards. 
 
Appraisal Theories of Emotions 
In sum, the present research sheds light on the elicitation of third-party anger 
and feelings of being moved. In what follows, I will argue that these findings have 
important implications for appraisal theories of emotions.  
According to appraisal theories of emotion, appraisals relate situational 
features to personal concerns and this elicits emotions (Scherer, 1999). As outlined 
above, two appraisal dimensions can be identified, which are particularly relevant 
for moral emotions: appraisals of others’ outcome and appraisals of norm 
compatibility. As depicted in Figure 2, the present research sheds light on the 
content of these appraisals and their relevance for specific moral emotions.  
 
Figure 2. Implications for appraisal theories of emotion 
 
Note. The figure depicts implications of the present research for 
appraisal theories of emotion.  
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Specifically, the present research supports the claim that appraisals of 
others’ outcome are needed to explain moral emotions. That is, people appraise 
others’ outcomes and these appraisals mediate the elicitation of compassion. 
Previous research has already shown that others’ suffering elicits compassion (e.g., 
Batson & Moran, 1999) and many appraisal theorist consider that a situation can be 
appraised in regard to others’ interests (see Goetz, Keltner & Simon-Thomas, 2010; 
Hareli & Parkinson, 2008). Nevertheless, a systematic integration into general 
appraisal theories that explains when and how others’ outcomes are considered is 
still missing. The present research empathizes the importance of such an 
integration. In particular, goal-conduciveness are not limited to outcomes 
concerning the emoter’s well-being but can address others’ well-being as well. 
Taken together, this strengthens the claim that additional processes like perspective-
taking (Omdahl, 1995), treating others’ well-being as an own goal (Nussbaum, 
2001) or group-based appraisals (Smith, 1993) are needed to explain moral 
emotions.  
Similarly, internal standard appraisals can be expanded. Appraisals of 
compatibility with standards (internal standard appraisals) typically address 
negative deviations from standards (Scherer, 2001). However, the present research 
shows that it does not only matter whether such a standard is violated but also which 
type of moral norm is violated. Specifically, anger was easily elicited by diverse 
norm violations except for purity violations, whereas the reverse holds for disgust. 
Thus, the type of norm violation differentiates the emotional reaction. 
Finally, people do not only appraise negative deviations but also positive 
deviations from standards. Specifically, appraisals about surpassing pro-social or 
achievement standards mediated the elicitation of being moved. Thus, people do 
not only appraise whether others violate standards but also whether they exceed 
standards and these evaluations can explain emotional reactions like being moved.  
In sum, appraisals of others’ outcome, appraisals about the type of norm 
violation and appraisals about exceeding norms successfully predicted emotions. 
Thus, integrating these appraisal components into standard instruments for 
appraisal assessment such as the Geneva Appraisal Questionnaire (GAQ, Scherer, 
2001) should significantly improve the predictive validity of these instruments. 
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Morality and Emotions 
Taken together, the present research sheds light on the elicitation of third-
party anger and being moved and specifies appraisals of moral emotions. In what 
follows, I will outline how this contributes to the more general questions of how 
morality and emotions are related.  
The idea that morality and emotions are related is emphasized by the moral 
intuitions approach (for a review see Haidt, 2001). According to this approach, 
moral judgement can result from fast and emotionally laden processes (i.e., moral 
intuitions) instead of consciously weighing arguments (i.e., moral reasoning) 
(Haidt, 2001). In other words, people sometimes evaluate a behavior spontaneously 
as morally good or bad without much thinking. This spontaneous evaluation is 
associated with feelings of (dis-)approval or even with strong emotions (Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004). Recent psychological research suggests that people use both – moral 
reasoning and moral intuition - although scholars differ in their assumptions about 
whether the two processes are independent (e.g., Greene et al., 2008) or intertwined 
(e.g., Narvaez, 2010). The present research shows that moral emotions like third-
party anger and being moved are associated with appraisals. Although appraisals 
are seen as fast and intuitive assessments of the world and thus as different from 
moral reasoning (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003), appraisals might influence moral 
reasoning and vice versa.7 In other words, appraisals might bridge the gap between 
moral intuition and moral reasoning. 
Interestingly, these appraisals of moral emotions each have their counterpart 
in philosophical approaches to moral reasoning. Specifically, outcome appraisals 
can be seen as reflecting consequentialism and internal standard appraisals as 
reflecting deontology. According to consequentialism, which is based on the ethics 
of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, actions should be judged by their 
consequences (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). The consequences of a situation are 
typically assessed by outcome appraisals (Scherer, 2001). As shown in the present 
research, these outcome appraisals are not limited to own outcomes but can concern 
others’ outcomes as well. Thus, consequentialism is reflected in outcome 
appraisals. These consequentialist considerations are often contrasted with 
deontological considerations. According to deontology, which is based on 
Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative, actions should be judged in regard to their 
conformity with universal rules (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Whether an action 
21 
 
conforms or deviates from rules, norms or standards is covered by internal standard 
appraisals (Scherer, 2001). Thus, deontology is reflected in internal standard 
appraisals. The involvement of appraisals suggests that emotional processes are 
relevant in both – consequentialist and deontological considerations.  
This, however, conflicts with the dual-process theory of morality (Greene 
et al., 2001; 2008), which implies that deontological judgement is driven by 
affective processes whereas consequentialist judgment is based on controlled 
cognitive processes (Greene et al., 2008). This theory is supported by research on 
moral dilemmas, which shows that brain regions related to emotion (i.e. the limbic 
system) are more strongly activated during deontological judgments (Greene et al., 
2001) and that cognitive load interferes with consequentialist judgment (Greene et 
al., 2008). The present research is consistent with the claim that processes 
underlying deontological and consequentialist judgments differ. However, it 
suggests that beyond moral dilemmas emotions are involved in consequentialist as 
well as in deontological judgment.  
Morality, however, might even be more facetted. Moral foundation theory 
(Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Graham, 2007) states that moral judgement and 
behavior is based on five moral principles which are care, fairness, authority, 
loyalty and purity. Thus, when focusing on justice only (which dominated research 
for a long time including Kohlberg’s moral stages) one cannot understand how 
people judge right from wrong (Graham et al., 2013). Also, when considering the 
ethic of care in addition (which was introduced by Gillian in order to cover women’s 
view on morality8), one cannot fully understand human morality (Graham et al., 
2013). According to Graham et al. (2013), considering non-western societies was 
necessary to uncover authority, loyalty and purity as additional moral foundations.  
The present research does not contradict this broad conception of morality 
but challenges the part of moral foundation theory that links each moral foundation 
to a specific emotion (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2008). The present research 
demonstrates that only care and purity violations elicit specific emotions (i.e., 
compassion and disgust). Violations of fairness, authority and loyalty elicited 
similar degrees of anger, rage and resentment. Thus, neither the specific morality-
emotion links proposed by moral foundation theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2008) 
nor the claim that emotional reactions to moral violations are completely unspecific 
(Cameron et al., 2015) was supported. Rather, it is possible that moral principles 
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are in fact rooted in emotional systems (Haidt & Joseph, 2004), however, the links 
between morality and emotion are different from the links moral foundation theory 
suggests. 
Taken together, morality and emotions are related in several ways. That is, 
different facets of morality such as consequentialist and deontological 
considerations correspond to affective processes. This correspondence does not 
imply that emotions cause moral judgments or motivate morally relevant behavior 
in every single situation (Prinz, 2006). Evidence for the causal role of emotions in 
moral judgement and behavior is in general rather weak (for a review see Huebner, 
Dwyer & Hauser, 2009). However, the ability to experience moral emotions might 
be necessary for the ability to form moral judgement and for the ability to behave 
in a morally correct manner (Prinz, 2006). That humans can respond emotionally to 
others’ negative outcomes and to different types of norm violations seems to be 
crucial for social life. In that sense, emotions might be guardians to the self-ideal 
(Arnold, 1960, p. 299 ff.) that guide our decisions and make social life possible.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
I outlined above how the present results contribute to the understanding of 
third-party anger and being moved, to appraisal theories of emotions and to 
approaches concerning morality and emotion in general. Limitations and potential 
applications are discussed in the following section. 
The present research is mainly based on self-reports. As the majority of 
research on moral emotions is based on self-reports, the present research can be 
easily tied in with the extant literature. Still, self-reports are potentially influenced 
by social desirability (Krumpal, 2013) and this limits the implications that can be 
drawn from the present findings. However, every method of emotion assessment 
has its drawbacks. For instance, neuro-imaging is limited by the noise and tightness 
in an fMRI-scanner (Sukel, 2016) and psychophysiological measures are typically 
associated with more than one psychological process (Hess, 2011). Thus, the 
present findings provide one important component in research on moral emotions 
that should be complemented with more objective measures. This is particularly 
important for the physiological reactions associated with feelings of being moved 
(i.e., chills, warm feeling in the chest and tears in the eyes) as people are generally 
23 
 
poor in predicting their own physiological responses (Hess, Sénecal & Thibeault, 
2004). In particular, chills could be measured by piloerection (i.e., goose bumps, 
Benedek et al., 2010). Furthermore, using self-reports for appraisal assessment has 
been criticized because appraisals are seen as fast and intuitive processes (see 
Scherer, 1999). To measure appraisals indirectly by specific appraisal outcomes 
such as expression patterns could be a solution to that (e.g., Lanctôt & Hess, 2007). 
The developed materials (e.g., newspaper articles in which norm and outcome can 
be varied independently; moving music, texts and videos) provide a useful basis for 
such future research projects.  
The present research specifies appraisals of moral emotions and thus 
contributes to appraisal assessment. However, appraisals cannot explain all 
emotional episodes. Specifically, being moved by music is probably elicited by 
different mechanisms (Scherer & Zentner, 2001). For instance, music can elicit 
specific associations (based on previous experiences) or it can lead to emotional 
contagion (based on structural and expressive features of the music) (Scherer & 
Zentner, 2001). To investigate these processes further can help to better understand 
the role of appraisals for emotion in general and the function of being moved in 
particular. 
The findings concerning third-party anger have important implications for 
media use. The present research indicates that reporting about norm violations in 
the media can elicit strong feelings of anger. Mentioning the harm done, by contrast, 
does not necessarily increase these feelings. Importantly, third-party anger can lead 
to punishment. In other words, communicating norm violations in the media can 
result in anger and the desire to punish the wrongdoer. Concretely, to call for more 
indignation like in the popular pamphlet Indignez-Vouz! (Hessel, 2011) might lead 
to collective action that enriches societies (Van Zomeren et al., 2004) but it can also 
enforce destructive actions like punishing those who are judged responsible for the 
injustice. However, we assessed punishment in terms of reducing others’ resources. 
We did not assess whether people would also advocate more severe measures like 
physical punishment. Many people endorse physical punishment in terms of harsh 
interrogation when the respondent was involved in severe criminal acts like terrorist 
attacks (Carlsmith & Sood, 2008). To investigate the role of outcomes and norm 
violations in these extreme cases can help to determine how far people go when 
they are morally outraged.  
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Findings concerning feelings of being moved suggest that their practical 
relevance might be more diverse than previous research suggests. Being moved by 
exceptional helpfulness increases pro-social actions (Freeman et al., 2009; Lai et 
al., 2014; Schnall et al., 2010; Thomson & Siegel, 2013). However, given the 
diverse elicitors and values associated with being moved, it is unlikely that feelings 
of being moved always lead to pro-social actions. It is much more likely that being 
moved facilitates actions, which are in accordance with the value that elicited the 
emotion (Cova & Deonna, 2014). For instance, if someone is moved by success, 
this might facilitate behavior that enhances the person’s own success rather than 
helping behavior. Thus, feelings of being moved can increase helping and caring 
but these feelings might also facilitate non-prosocial behavior. This opens the door 
for potential misuse of feelings of being moved for manipulative techniques in 
advertisement and persuasion. For instance, advertisement with moving music 
might be particularly successful. More importantly, it is possible that persuasion 
videos like those used by radical groups (Kruglanski et al., 2015) convince some 
young people because they are moved and overwhelmed by these clips. To 
investigate the role of being moved in such persuasion processes is an important 
topic for future research.  
In sum, more research is needed to validate the present findings with 
objective measures and to clarify the behavioral consequences of third-party anger 
and being moved. Despite these limitations, the present research contributes to the 
question how third-party anger and being moved are elicited, how appraisal theories 
can be applied to moral emotions, how moral principles and emotions are related 
and what the potential role of these processes for social life might be.  
 
Conclusion 
Taken together, the present research sheds light on the elicitation of third-
party anger and being moved and thereby clarifies how morality and emotion are 
related. We can be outraged by moral transgressions and we can be deeply moved 
by exceptional helpfulness. These emotions are associated with moral principles, 
elicited by appraisals and related to socially relevant behavior. Considering these 
processes can help to explain why people sometimes restrain their self-interest, 
which makes social life possible.  
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Footnotes 
 
1 Anger that third-parties experience, when they witness an injustice that 
affects others has been previously labelled “moral outrage” (e.g., Montada & 
Schneider, 1989), “empathic anger” (e.g., Batson et al., 2007) or “group-based 
anger” (e.g., Halperin, 2013). 
 
2 According to Schwartz (2007), values are „trans-situational goals […] that 
serve as guiding principles in the life of a person“ (p. 712). Such guiding principles 
(or values) can be so-called moral values like justice but also non-moral values like 
achievement (Schwartz, 2007). Throughout this dissertation, the term “value” refers 
to Schwartz’ definition of values. 
 
3 Appraisal theories can be led back to the psychologist Magda Arnold. In 
her book Emotions and Personality (1960), she describes the idea that emotions are 
elicited and differentiated on the basis of appraisals. In addition to this well-known 
and highly important contribution to emotion research, she also outlines her ideas 
about the role of emotions for morally correct behavior. According to Arnold 
(1960), emotions help us to measure up with our own self-ideals. Specifically, she 
claims that when someone “has done something he judges wrong, he will 
experience a variety of emotions that urge him to repair his action. Conversely, his 
progress towards his self-ideal is supported by positive emotions, by his love for 
everything that is good, true and beautiful” (Arnold, 1960, p. 299). This shows that 
the role of emotions for morality was already acknowledged in early appraisal 
theory.  
 
4 In her book Cognitive Appraisal, Emotion, and Empathy Becky Omdahl 
(1995) outlines the gap between empathy and appraisal theories of emotion. She 
argues that additional processes such as perspective-taking are needed to explain 
empathic reactions (Omdahl, 1995). Specifically, she argues that “When a person 
takes another’s perspective and comes to appraise the situation in the same way, the 
perspective taker should apply the emotion rules to perceptions of the other’s 
situation. If the same aspects of the situation are noted (e.g., the appraisals of the 
storyteller are matched by the reader), the same emotions should be elicited in the 
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reader as were experienced by the sender” (Omdahl, 1995, p. 140 f.). In that sense, 
empathy occurs when we imagine to be in another person’s place and appraise the 
situation as if we were them. 
 
5 In her book Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotion, the 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2001) provides an appraisal approach to 
compassion. Specifically, she claims that compassion requires the belief that “a 
serious bad event has befallen someone” (judgement of size), that “this person did 
not bring the suffering on himself or herself” (judgment of nondesert) and that “this 
person […] is a significant element in my scheme of goals” (eudaimonistic 
judgment) (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 321). Eudaimonia consists of the Greek words eu 
(i.e., good) and daimon (i.e., spirit) and represents the good and virtuous life in 
ancient Greek philosophy (Hursthouse, 2012). According to Nussbaum (2001), 
making an eudaimonistic judgment means to appraise the welfare of someone as an 
“end in itself” (p. 321) rather than as a mean for another goal. In that sense, for real 
compassion it is necessary to appraise another’s well-being as an own goal. 
 
6 Eliot Smith (1993) introduced the concept of group-based emotions and 
group-based appraisals. Specifically, he argues that “to the extent a self-
categorization functions as a self-aspect, appraisals of events or situations with 
respect to that social aspect of identity will also trigger emotion” (Smith, 1993, p. 
303). In other words, we can appraise the relevance of a situation in regard to the 
interests of those groups we identify with. 
 
7 Different approaches link appraisals to moral reasoning. According to the 
appraisal tendency approach (Horberg, Oveis & Keltner, 2011), specific emotions 
are associated with specific appraisals and these appraisals can influence moral 
judgment. A different approach is provided by the reverse engineering model 
(Hareli & Hess, 2010; Hareli, Moran-Amir, David & Hess, 2013), according to 
which people can reconstruct appraisals from others’ emotion expression. These 
reverse engineered appraisals can be used to make inferences about the other’s 
character (Hareli & Hess, 2010) and about social norms (Hareli et al., 2013). 
Although these approaches differ in many respects, both illustrate that appraisals 
can bridge the gap between emotion and moral reasoning. 
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8 Research in fact points to small gender differences in moral judgment. 
Specifically, a meta-analysis revealed that women are more care oriented than men 
(d = - .28) and reversely men are more justice oriented than women (d = .19) (Joffe 
& Hyde, 2000). However, as these gender differences are rather small, the original 
claim that men and women base their moral judgment on completely different 
principles was not supported (Joffe & Hyde, 2000). Throughout the studies of this 
dissertation, the effects are stable when controlling for gender. 
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